Critical Flaw in Windows Server 2025 Allows Full AD Compromise via BadSuccessor
Akamai researchers have discovered a critical flaw in a new Windows Server 2025 feature that could allow attackers to compromise any Active Directory (AD) account—even with limited initial access. The exploit, dubbed BadSuccessor, leverages a misconfiguration risk in delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs), opening the door to full domain compromise.
A High-Impact Vulnerability Hidden in a New Feature
The vulnerability, uncovered by Akamai researcher Yuval Gordon, targets delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs)—a new Windows Server 2025 feature designed to simplify service account management. The idea is straightforward: when replacing a service account, the new dMSA can inherit permissions from the older one it supersedes.
However, Akamai’s research reveals a critical flaw in this inheritance process. With only minimal privileges—such as the ability to create or modify a dMSA object—an attacker can manipulate two specific attributes:
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**msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink**
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**msDS-DelegatedMSAState**
By setting msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink
to reference any target user (even a Domain Admin) and marking msDS-DelegatedMSAState
as 2
(indicating a completed migration), the attacker tricks the system into granting the new dMSA all the permissions of the targeted account.
Why It Matters: Full AD Takeover, Minimal Effort
This attack doesn’t require any direct access to the victim account itself. Instead, it abuses trust in the migration logic to silently escalate privileges. The implications are massive:
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Complete control over any AD user, including Domain Admins
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Ability to impersonate, manipulate, or exfiltrate data under any identity
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Access levels equivalent to DCSync attacks—without requiring replication permissions
According to Akamai’s internal testing, 91% of real-world AD environments already grant users the necessary permissions to carry out this attack.
No Patch Available—Yet
Microsoft was notified of the vulnerability on April 1, 2025, but as of this writing, no official patch exists. Microsoft currently categorizes the issue as Moderate severity, noting that some level of privilege is needed to exploit it.
However, Akamai researchers strongly disagree with the assessment, emphasizing that the CreateChild permission on an Organizational Unit—commonly granted to standard operators—is enough to perform the attack. This places many organizations at serious risk, particularly those who may not yet understand the implications of this new dMSA feature.
“This vulnerability introduces a previously unknown and high-impact abuse path that makes it possible for any user with CreateChild permissions on an OU to compromise any user in the domain.” — Akamai Research Team
What Organizations Should Do Now
Until a patch is released, Akamai urges organizations to take proactive defense measures, including:
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Audit and monitor dMSA object creation and attribute changes
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Restrict CreateChild permissions on OUs containing sensitive users
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Regularly review ACLs on critical OUs and dMSA objects
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Train AD administrators on the risks of dMSA abuse
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Implement stricter privilege delegation and role-based access controls
Final Thoughts
The BadSuccessor vulnerability is a clear example of how new features—while designed for efficiency—can introduce dangerous attack surfaces when not thoroughly secured. As Windows Server 2025 adoption increases, so too does the need to fully understand the security implications of its evolving architecture.
Until Microsoft releases an official fix, visibility, permission hardening, and threat detection are your best defense against this silent and severe privilege escalation vector.
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